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OHIO HOUSE BILL 869 AND SIMILAR STATUTES:
An Analysis of Mandatory Deposits on Beverage Containers
To Promote Recycling in Relation to
Environmental Control
INTRODUCTIONp ROPOSED HOUSE BILL 8691 requires that all soft drink and beer
containers carry a mandatory five-cent deposit in order to promote
their recycling. This would necessarily cause a reduction in the litter
discarded along Ohio's highways, parks, beaches, etc. To Ohio environ-
mentalists, the Bill represents a major legislative response to the growing
litter and solid waste problem. However, to industry it represents a major
curtailment of their production growth and profits, specifically those
industries whose production is concentrated solely or substantially in the
area of non-returnable cans and bottles. If the Bill becomes effective it
will be a major victory for environmentalists.
Similar legislation already has been enacted in Oregon. 2 This
legislation, called the "Bottle Bill," became effective on October 1, 1972 3
and is the prototype for not only Ohio's proposed Bill but also for many
other states that have similar legislative proposals.
The significance of the Ohio and Oregon bills, along with other
states' proposals, is that they represent an exercise by states of their police
power in order to control their environment. Such control is achieved by
compelling soft drink and beer industries to recycle the containers which
they use in marketing their products. Since such legislation encompasses
interstate commerce, a major clash emerges between the police power
of the states and the Commerce Clause of the federal government.
Also, since the legislation concentrates solely on soft drink and beer
containers, the issues of equal protection and due process challenge
the legislation's constitutionality.
This comment will analyze the constitutional issues involved and
also provide some direction to the economic impact that such legislation
will have on industry and the consumer.
1 H.B. 869, 110th Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. §§ 913.241, 913.242, 913.243, 4301.031,
amending, OHIO REv. CODE § 913.99, 4301.99 (Supp. 1972) [hereinafter referred to
as the Bill].
2 ORE. REV. STAT. ch. 459.810-459.992 (1972).
3 E. CLAUSSEN, OREGON'S BOTTLE BILL: THE FIRST SIX MONTHS, S.W. 109 at 2 (1973).
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Solid Waste Disposal and Beverage Containers: An Overview
Statistics show that out of the 3.5 billion tons of solid waste
accumulated each year, approximately 30 billion bottles and 60 billion
cans contribute to the mass. 4 Also, in 1969, 43.8 billion containers for
beer and soft drinks were manufactured, and it is estimated that by
1980, 100 billion of these containers will be produced and discarded every
year.5 Regulatory response to the problem has concentrated on handling
the used containers only after they have become a part of the accumulated
mass of solid waste rather than controlling production. As of now there
are a variety of regulatory processes dealing with disposing of solid
waste.6 However, upon analysis it will be seen that each process is
inherently or economically inefficient in attempting to control the disposal
problem. The processes pertinent to the disposal of beverage containers
are sanitary landfilling, incineration and salvaging.
The sanitary landfill or closed dump creates its own unique problems.
For instance, despite the cover of earth over the landfill, fires can be
generated underground which are caused by temperatures which reach
100 degrees within a few days after the solid waste is covered.7 Secondly,
when the solid waste starts to degrade, it forms gases, some of which have
an explosive character.8 The Bureau of Solid Waste Management considers
94 percent of all landfills and incinerators to be inadequate, with an
estimated $4.2 billion needed to upgrade existing operations.9 And once
land, especially in heavily populated areas, becomes scarce, solid waste
will have to be hauled long distances, causing tremendous increases in the
disposal costs. 10 Accordingly, it appears that open dumping and sanitary
landfilling are relatively inadequate methods of disposal.
Incineration only reduces solid waste by 75 percent, with the residue
being dumped into the already inadequate landfills." More importantly,
since bottles and cans do not decompose through incineration, it is a
wholly inadequate solution to the problem of disposing of beverage
containers. Salvaging bottles and cans from incinerators is ineffective since
4 Hollister, To Reduce Litter, 8 HoUSTON L. REv. 687, 688 (1971); F. GRA,
ENvR ONmENTAL LAW, SOLiD WASTES § 4.01(1) at 4-4 (1971).
5 Solid Waste Management, Environmental Quality and State Government 32, 36
(1970).
6 Schmoyer, The Legal Framework of Solid Waste Disposal, 2 ENVIRON. L. REv. 312,
314 (1971); See also F. GRAD, supra note 4, at 4-27.
7 Schmoyer, supra note 6, at 319.
8 Id. at 320.
9 Solid Waste Management, supra note 5, at 34.
10 The Garbage Explosion, TIME, May 26, 1967 at 53.
11 Schmoyer, supra note 6, at 317.
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the relative worth of these containers makes them economically unfeasible
for collection and recycling after they have been mixed with other wastes.'
The best solution in controlling solid waste is to recycle the mass
at the earliest opportunity. This goal is adequately encompassed in
the Ohio and Oregon bills. Their intended purpose is to reduce the
number of littered beverage containers, to enhance collection of these
containers, and to reduce the burden placed on solid waste collection.'
3
Although some industrialists favor such legislation,14 many advocate
indirect methods such as strong anti-litter laws and public education.' 5
Unfortunately, these answers are not adequate solutions to the problem
because they just do not work.16
Two Bills-A Comparison
The Ohio and Oregon bills will be compared in order to point out
their distinctions and to show how states are attempting to effectuate
mandatory deposits on beverage containers.
Ohio's House Bill 869, if it is enacted, will become effective after
December 31, 1973, and will encompass any soft drink, beer or malt
beverage carried in a glass, metal, or plastic container.17 Each of the
enumerated containers will have a mandatory five-cent deposit placed
upon it to be charged by the retailer and paid by the purchaser.'" The
refund value will be placed explicitly on each container, 9 and the tradi-
tional flip-top cap or pull tab will be eliminated. 20 This means that all
containers covered within the purview of the statute will have to be opened
with a can opener. Redemption centers can be established by any person
so long as such center is approved by the Department of Agriculture,21
and at the redemption center, any purchaser may procure a refund on his
deposit.22 The Department of Agriculture may, at any time after written
notice to the person who established the center and those dealers who are
affected 'by the center, withdraw approval of the center if it no longer
12 Note, Solid Waste Pollution: Control of Container Packaging Through Taxation,
1973 URBAN L. ANN. 387, 388. See also T. BINGHAM AND P. MULLIGAN, TIE
BEVERAGE CONTAINER PROBLEM-ANALYSIS AND REcoMMENDATIONS, Contract No.
68-03-0038 (1972).
13T. BINGHAM and P. MULLIGAN, supra note 12.
14Ways, How to Think About the Environment, FORTUNE, Feb. 1970, Vol. 81, Part
I, at 98, 118.
15 F. GRAD, supra note 4, at 4-84.
16 BINGHAM and MULLIGAN, supra note 12, at 79.
17H.B. 869, 110th Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. §§ 913.241, 913.241(A), 913.242, 913.243,
4301.031, 4301.031(A), amending, OHIO REV. CODE §§ 913.99, 4301.99 (Supp. 1972).
18 Id. §§ 913.241 (A) 1, 4301.031 (A) (1).
19 Id. §§ 913.241 (A) (2), 4301.031 (A) (2).
2o ld.
21 Id. §§ 913.242.
22 Id.
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serves as a convenience to the consumer or does not comply with the
orders set out by the Department.23 The Department shall conduct contin-
uing surveys to determine the Bill's economic impact, 24 its practical effect
upon recycling, 25 and its effectiveness of reducing litter.26 An annual
report shall be filed by the Department of Agriculture to the General
Assembly 27 stating its findings and recommendations for legislation.25
Oregon's Bottle Bill is more comprehensive than the Ohio Bill. Under
the Oregon Bill, beverage containers have a refund value of not less than
five cents 29 as opposed to the mandatory five-cent deposit stated in the
Ohio Bill. Although this provision is more flexible than Ohio's, it will be
seen that its impact on the Bill's effectiveness will be miniscule. Further-
more, in Oregon, if a beverage container is certified it carries a deposit of
not less than two cents, 0 with all other beverage containers carrying a
deposit of not less than five cents. A container is certified if it is reusable
by more than one manufacturer in the ordinary course of business 31 and
if more than one manufacturer will accept the container for reuse.32 This
provision promotes the use of reusable containers of uniform design.33
There is no such provision in the Ohio Bill, and although this provision
will probably have little impact on non-returnables, it could have a major
impact on returnables by consequently placing a burden on interstate com-
merce by forcing out-of-state manufacturers to change their product design.
Another major distinction between the two bills is that the Oregon
Bill mandates that a dealer shall not refuse to accept from a customer
any beverage containers that are covered within the Bill 34 and, more
importantly, that a distributor cannot refuse to accept from a dealer any
containers covered. 35 This latter provision is not included in the Ohio Bill.
Its practical effect is that in Oregon all beverage containers, if brought
back by the consumer, will ultimately be returned to the distributor who
will then have the burden of recycling the containers for reuse. This is the
exact end that the Bill is trying to effectuate. However, since under the Ohio
Bill a distributor need not repurchase the used containers from the dealer,
23 Id.
24 Id. § 913.243(A).
25 Id. § 913.243 (B).
26 Id. § 913.243(C).
27 Id. § 913.243.
28 Id. § 913.243(E).
29 ORE. R V. STAT. ch. 459.820(1) (1972).
30 Id. ch. 459.820(2).
31 Id. ch. 459.820(2) (a).
32 Id. ch. 459.8 10.
33 Id. ch. 459.860.
34 Id. ch. 459.830(1).
35 Id. ch. 459.830(2).
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the burden of redistributing the used containers for reuse is placed
upon the dealer with the intended purpose of the Bill being prostituted.
The last major feature that distinguishes the two bills is that under
the Oregon Bill a dealer may refuse to accept a beverage container for
refund if the container does not have a refund value placed upon it,3 6 or
if the container can be taken to a properly established redemption center.
3 7
This provision is pertinent in not only protecting the dealer from having
to return deposits on containers which have not been subject to a deposit
(for instance, bottles and cans purchased outside of the state), but more
importantly, by affording the right to force consumers to return containers
to 'a redemption center, he is alleviated from having to handle a large
quantity of used containers which he may not be able to accept because
of a lack of storage space. Clearly, this provision should be incorporated
into the Ohio Bill for the protection of the dealer. It provides a
tremendous benefit to the dealer with little extra burden to the consumer.
Based on this information, an analysis can now be made of the economic
and constitutional aspects of the Ohio and Oregon bills.
The Economic Impact of a Mandatory
Deposit on Beverage Containers
A recent report completed in Oregon shows that a mandatory
deposit on beverage containers causes substantial decline in the sale of
non-returnable containers and an increase in the sale of returnables.18 This
outcome is predictable because if consumers are going to have to return
empty containers, they are going to buy those containers that sell for the
lowest price which is usually the returnable bottle. Since statistics show
that there is a major market for non-returnables, an analysis should
be made of the economic implications associated with a reduction in
non-returnable containers.
A decrease in the sale of beverages in non-returnable containers
causes a reduction in retail orders from suppliers which ultimately reduces
the production of these items. This curtailment results in a reduction,
by the manufacturer, of purchases for supplies and materials, and thus
reduces employment.3 9 However, this employment reduction will be offset
by a rise in employment in other industries caused by the increased sales
of beverages in returnable containers. Manufacturers who produce, almost
exclusively, non-returnable bottles and cans state that in order to transform
their present systems into a returnable distribution system, additional costs
would have to be incurred for larger warehouse space, double container
36 Id. ch. 459.840(1).
37 Id. ch. 459.840(2).
38E. CLAUSSEN, supra note 3, at 8.
39 FOLK, Two PAPERS ON THE EFFECTS OF MANDATORY DEPOSITS ON BEVERAGE
CONTAINERS, C.A.C. Doc. No. 73 at 2 (1972) [hereinafter cited as FOLK].
[Vol. 7:2
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handling in the plant, in-plant sanitizing of containers, safety inspection
of used containers, less-than-capacity vehicular loading, increased time
per stop to sort and load empties, fewer stops per route, more costly
delivery equipment and more delivery employees. 40 It should be noted
further that out-of-state manufacturers will have greater transportation
costs for delivering and collecting retumables, as compared with in-state
manufacturers, causing them to accept either a lower profit margin or an
increase in sales price. However, the manufacturer will be afforded some
cost benefits by incurring tax write-offs due to corporate investments.
41
And, once the complete shift to returnables has been procured, there will
be a large savings due to the use of containers that are used only once."
The manufacturer of non-returnable bottles and cans has the greatest
economic burden since to survive in the market, a compelte change in
its product mix must be procured. In some cases such a transformation
will be economically unfeasible and force the manufacturer out of
business,4" but that burden is not forecasted for distributor and retailers.
The distributor will have increased employment due to additional
salesmen and drivers, 44 which offsets the reduction of employment in the
manufacturing industry.4 Also, since delivery and pickup will be
augmented by the larger percentage of returnables used, additional
expense will be incurred for more trucks, etc. There would also be a
capital loss from canning lines being rendered useless with a savings
in overhead from not having to operate multiple lines.
Many retailers would prefer handling just one system, either
returnable or non-returnable, but not both.4 For instance, in Oregon,
after the Bottle Bill came into effect, the retailers announced that they
would not carry national brands in non-returnables but would do so for
returnables. 47 Although mark-ups are usually higher for non-returnables
48
the retailer is afforded the convenience of not having to deal with the
container after it is purchased. In contrast, returnables require additional
handling by the retailer after the containers are returned causing increased
costs for storage and labor.49 However, the initial cost of purchasing the
container will be less in an all-returnable system because of the trippage rate.
40 Brief for Appellant at 38, American Can Company v. Oregon Liquor Control
Commission, 4 E.R.C. 1584 (Ore. Cir. Ct. 1972).
41BIGH m and MULLIGAN, supra note 13, at 60.
42 FOLK, supra note 39, at 12.
43 Brief for Appellant, supra note 40, at 30.
44 FOLK, supra note 39, at 73.
45 BiNGHAM and MULLIGAN, supra note 13, at 60.
46 FOLK, supra note 39, at 7.
47 Id. at 10.
481d. at 7.
49 Id,
Winter, 1974]
6
Akron Law Review, Vol. 7 [1974], Iss. 2, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol7/iss2/3
Under both the Ohio and Oregon bills, if consumers purchase a
large quantity of containers and subsequently discard them without
seeking a return on their deposit, the forfeited deposit will be a profit to
the retailer, or as in the above bills, five cents on every container not
returned.50 If the retailer market is competitive, the retailer may want
to use the gain to reduce his selling price on the containers not yet
sold.51 Hypothetically, if none of the containers were returned, the
retailer could reduce his price by five cents, assuming that is the deposit
rate, and thus offer the beverage at the price that was operable before the
mandatory deposit became effective.52 Should most of the containers be
returned, the retailer will incur the cost of redeeming and disposing of the
containers which then will have to be added to his sales cost.5 3 As stated,
under the Oregon Bill, the retailer can refuse to accept any containers
that can be properly returned to redemption centers.5 4 This alleviates the
cost of storage and handling on the part of the retailer and consequently
causes the whole recycling process on the retail level to function more
smoothly. The Ohio Bill should be amended to include such retailer
protection. Another deficiency in the Ohio Bill that is pertinent to the
retailer is his right to collect a refund from the distributor of every
container returned. Such a provision is included in the Oregon Bill, and
therein alleviates any burden that could be placed on the retailer if the
distributor refused to accept the returned containers. Many retailers will
not have adequate storage space to accept large quantities of containers
and are financially unable to build larger storage space. Since one of the
main purposes of a mandatory deposit is to recycle containers, a provision
is needed in the Ohio Bill to force the recyclable containers back up the
marketing chain. Without the above two amendments, the Ohio Bill is
inherently deficient in bringing about the object that it intends to create.
Cost to the consumer should also be considered. Many consumers
are presently paying two cents extra for soft drinks and one cent extra for
beer in non-returnable containers. 56 This convenience costs the consumer
approximately $598.4 million. If a non-returnable bottle or can is not
returned, as provided for under a mandatory deposit system, the
consumer who refused the deposit will suffer the loss and either
the retailer or other consumers will benefit by either increased profits or
50 Id. at 11.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 ORE. REV. STAT. ch. 459.840(2) (1972).
55 H.B. 869, 110th Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. §§ 913.241, 913.241(A) (1), 913.242, 913.243,
4301.031, 4301.031(A)(1), amending, OHIO REv. CODE, §§ 913.99, 4301.99 (Supp.
1972).
56 BINGHAM and MULLIGAN, supra note 13, at 57.
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reduced sales prices as stated above. 57 But if a returnable bottle is
discarded and not returned, all consumers are disadvantaged since the
discarded container must be replaced by a new one.
58 In both cases, if
neither kind of container is returned, society must pay the cost to clean
up those containers that are littered and then the cost of disposing of them
along with other solid waste. This does not take into consideration the
aesthetic cost involved which is incapable of being calculated.
The above analysis is not a total picture of the impact a mandatory
deposit has on industry, etc., since there is relatively little information on
the subject due to the newness of the legislation in this area. Oregon is the
only state that has a statewide statute such as this in operation; and,
therefore, it is essential that the statistics compiled in that state be
analyzed to see how the mandatory deposit system has actually affected
industry. A report, as stated, was compiled on the effects of the Bill six
months after it took effect.59 It was therein reported that prior to the
enactment of the Bill, 51 percent of all soft drinks were sold in refillable
bottles, eight percent in non-refillable bottles, and 41 percent in cans.
60
Six months after the Bill was enacted, no disposable soft drink bottles
were being sold and can sales decreased to less than one percent.
6
' Beer
sold in cans, prior to the Bill's enactment, represented 35 percent of the
market.62 Beer cans now represent less than one percent of the market.6
As was expected, manufacturers of non-returnable containers have been
adversely affected. The glass container manufacturers, however, increased
their market share, but they incurred extra costs because of having to
change their production to returnables rather than non-returnables.
6 4 It is
estimated that out-of-state brewers have had increased shipping costs
amounting to 38 percent, with an additional 28 cents per case to return
them.65 Further, retailers have experienced some inconvenience in handling
the large quantities of bottles being returned but increased pickups by the
bottlers are expected to minimize this problem.66 As of March, 1973, it
was estimated that 142 jobs have been created in the bottling industry
to offset these losses.
67
The Oregon report substantiates the general trend expected from
57 See text accompanying notes 80 and 81 supra.
58 FOLK, supra note 39, at 15.
59 See note 38 supra.
60 E. CLAUSSEN, supra note 3, at 8.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 12.
66 Id. at 13.
67Id. at 14.
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placing mandatory deposits on beverage containers. Since the effect of
such a bill substantially removes non-returnables from the market, it
could be asked why a statute banning non-returnables altogether has not
been enacted since it would have more of a direct effect. However, one
major advantage to a mandatory deposit bill is that it forces manufacturers
and brewers, etc., to conform to a returnable system gradually rather
than expecting them to accomplish an immediate transformation. This is
beneficial to the industry and in essence a more equitable approach to
the problem. Furthermore, once a returnable system is recognized by
industry, it, along with environmentalists and agencies concerned with
litter and solid waste eventually will work together to create solidarity
in attempting to solve these environmental problems.68 Industry is already
attempting to make such an effort.69
A Constitutional Analysis of
Beverage Container Legislation
The first constitutional issue that must be resolved is whether or not
a state has the police power, delegated to it by the tenth amendment of
the Federal Constitution, to enact legislation that places a mandatory
deposit on all beverage containers. To answer this, however, the term
police power must first be defined. The purview of police power has been
defined as the power of the state to enact any law that is related to the
health, safety, morals or general welfare of the public so long as it is not
arbitrary or unreasonable and bears a reasonable relationship to the object
that it attempts to procure.7 0 Although this traditional definition affords
some guidelines in measuring a state's power under the Constitution to
enact legislation for its people, it fails to define the precise scope of the
power.71 Consequently, an analysis must be made of the facts in each
case to determine whether or not the power is properly exercisable.'
Accordingly, in order to properly analyze the beverage container legisla-
tion, a determination of the facts surrounding such legislation is required.
One of the main objects or purposes to be procured by beverage
68 FOLK, supra note 39, at 33.
69 See F. GRAD, supra note 4, at 4-14, 4-16; Spofford, Jr., Solid Residuals Manage-
ment: Some Economic Considerations, 11 NATIONAL REsouRcEs J. 561, 565 (1971);Note, Solid Waste Disposal-Only a Rich Nation Could Waste and Litter So Much,MAN'S CONTROL. OF THE ENVIRONMENT 32, 35 (1970); Note, Solid Waste-ReturnableBeer Bottles Score High in West, Still Being Treated in East, 1 ENVIRON. REPORT.
665 (Oct. 23, 1970); Note, Solid Waste-Glass Container Manufacturers Plan BottleSalvage Centers in 21 States, I ENvIRON. RPRT. 261 (July 10, 1970); Note, SolidWaste-Aluminum Industry Expects to Recycle 87 Million Pounds of Cans During
1973, 3 ENvIRON. RPRT. 1174 (Jan. 26, 1973).
70 State v. Cromwell, 72 N.D. 515, 9 N.W.2d 914, 919-920 (1947), noted in Hollister,
To Reduce Litter, 8 HOUSTON L. REV. 687, 692, n. 21 (1971).
71 Garton, Ecology and the Police Power, 16 S.D.L. REV. 261, 263 (1971).
72 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.,S. 26 (1954).
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container legislation is to enhance recycling in order to reduce the litter
which is scattered around our highways, parks, and beaches, etc.73 As will
be seen, this not only develops a viable tool in controlling litter but also
helps to alleviate the massive solid waste problem confronting us today.
Such control has been necessitated by the fact that approximately 48
billion bottles and 46 billion cans are discarded each year.74 Also, in a
recent survey conducted in Oregon it was estimated that, excluding
plastics, 71 percent of all littered items were either cans or glass.75 These
statistics substantiate the claim that beverage container legislation is
paramount in controlling their use or abuse as the case may be.
Once it is established that a major problem exists in the use of
beverage containers, is legislation which purports to solve this problem
a reasonable object for state regulation since such legislation is based, at
least in part, on aesthetic or environmental reasons? Although the
prevailing view is that legislation must be based on something more than
aesthetic reasons to be upheld as constitutional,76 there is a growing trend
toward recognizing aesthetics as a valid exercise of a state's police power.
For instance, one of the first cases recognizing aesthetics as a valid
foundation for the exercise of state police power is People v. Stover.77
There, a disgruntled resident of the city of Rye, New York, protested a
local tax by placing a clothesline in his front yard and upon it placed
soiled clothes, leaving them there undisturbed. When his protests appeared
to be futile, he added additional clothesline accompanied by more soiled
clothes until the city passed an ordinance prohibiting the maintenance
of a clothesline in front or side yard that abutted a street, in order to
alleviate the distraction to motorists. The court upheld the ordinance
but based its decision on aesthetic principles rather than on the ostensible
safety reasons of the statute.78
Although litter per se is not necessarily as unsightly as soiled clothes,
the tremendous quantity of litter discarded each year in our open spaces
causes a very unsightly landscape, 79 and certainly, such unsightliness falls
under the language used in Stover. In a subsequent case, Oregon City
v. Hartke,80 the court was more categorical in its recognition of aesthetics
73 E. CLAUSSEN, supra note 3, at 3.
74 Hollister, To Reduce Litter, 8 HOUSTON L. REV. 687, 688 (1971).
75 Lesow, Litter and the Nonreturnable Beverage Container: A Comparative Analysis,
2 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 197, 203 (1971). But see Lesow at 199.
76 Stoner McCray System v. Des Moines, 247 Iowa 313, 78 N.W.2d 843 (1956).
77 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963).
78 Id. See also Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d
(1967) (citing Stoner for the proposition that aesthetic enhancement is valid if it is
regulated generally to the economic and cultural setting of the regulating community).
79 BINOHAM and MULLIGAN, supra note 13, at 81.
80 Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965).
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per se as a valid exercise of a state's police power when by upholding
a zoning ordinance it stated:
[t]here is a growing judicial recognition of the power of a city to
impose zoning restrictions which can be justified solely upon the
ground that they will tend to prevent or minimize discordant and
unsightly surroundings. This change in attitude is a reflection of the
refinement of our tastes and the growing appreciation of cultural
values in a maturing society. The change may be ascribed more
directly to the judicial expansion of the police power to include
within the concept of general welfare the enhancement of the
citizens' cultural life.8
The quoted language of Hartke is significant because the court gave
recognition to the concept that unsightliness per se is a valid object of
control by the state under general welfare. By analogy, the unsightliness
intended to be alleviated by the beverage container legislation seems to
fall within the categorical language of Hartke especially since the court
gave recognition to the expansion of the police power for aesthetic
reasons, i.e., the enhancement of citizens' cultural life. Clearly, such
expansion encompasses the beverage container legislation since its purpose
is almost identical to the legislation upheld in Hartke, i.e., the alleviation
of unsightly surroundings.
It is pertinent to note that beverage container legislation has been
upheld under the concept of police power, based on the fact that such
legislation reduces the danger to travelers on highways within the state and
also minimizes the property damage to residents owning property adjacent
to the highways.u Since such reasoning is non-aesthetic, beverage contain-
er legislation could be upheld as constitutional in those states that, as of
yet, do not recognize aesthetics per se as a valid exercise of police power.
Although the safety reason used to uphold beverage container
legislation is acceptable, in reality, it appears to be tenuous. Based on the
growing recognition of more and more courts to uphold aesthetics per se
as a valid exercise of police power, beverage container legislation should
be upheld based on aesthetics per se since such legislation purports to
alleviate litter and solid waste rather than reducing the physical danger
to travelers on highways, etc. Such a decision would give recognition to
the true purpose of the legislation and would lay the groundwork for
further legislation dealing with the environment. With the modem trend
of courts accepting aesthetics per se as a valid exercise of police power
and since some court decisions have upheld beverage container legislation
8l Id. at 261. See also Leighty, Aesthetics as a Legal Basis for Environmental Control,
17 WAYNE L. REv. 1347, 1380 (1971).
82 Anchor Hocking Glass Corp. v. Barber, 118 Vt. 206, 105 A.2d 271 (1954). See
also American Can Company v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 4 E.R.C. 1584,
1588 (1972).
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on non-aesthetic grounds, it seems clear that the Oregon and Ohio bills
are constitutional under the tenth amendment.
Once it is determined that the object attempting to be achieved by
the Oregon and Ohio bills is valid under the tenth amendment, the next
question that must be answered is whether or not that object bears a
reasonable relationship to the public's health, safety, morals or general
welfare. For if it does not, there is a denial of substantial due process
under the fourteenth amendment.
The United States Supreme Court in Nebbia v. New York, 3
established the traditional test for substantive due process when it
concluded that any state legislation would not be violative of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments' due process clauses unless it is unreasonable,
arbitrary, or capricious and does not have a real and substantial relation
to the object sought to be attained.8 4 Prior to the enactment of the Oregon
Bill, it was estimated that 62 percent of all litter in Oregon was formed
by beverage containers. 85 A continual survey was taken to see the impact
of the Bill on the reduction of beverage container litter and it was
estimated that the amount of beverage containers in litter was reduced by
96 percent.86 Based on these facts alone, it is obvious that the Bill has
a real and substantial relation to the object sought, i.e., a reduction in the
litter of beverage containers. Notwithstanding this, the United States
Supreme Court in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,87 declared that the
Court will no longer sit as super-legislators when weighing the due process
clause against the state's police power and, therefore, laws will not be
struck down which regulate business merely because they are unwise,
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.
86
Although it cannot be disputed that the Bill has a major impact on
industry, as was shown above, nevertheless, in Northwestern Laundry v.
Des Moines8 9 a statute having a similar impact on industry was upheld. In
that case the United States Supreme Court upheld a statute that prohibited
the emission of dense smoke in certain portions of the city causing
substantial capital expense to certain corporations affected by the statute.
Although such a statute can be distinguished from the Bottle Bill in that
the former deals with large quantities of smoke that could be substantially
damaging to people's health, nevertheless, pertinent to the Bottle Bill is
the court's statement that state regulations will not be held to be invalid
83Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1933).
84d. at 525. See also Stern, The Problems of Yesteryear-Commerce and Due
Process, 4 VAND. L REv. 446, 449-450 (1951).
85 E. CLAUSSEN, supra note 3, at 4.
86 Id. at 7.
87 Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
88 Id. at 488. See also Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
89 Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486 (1915).
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on due process grounds even if it requires "the discontinuance of the use
of the property or subjects the occupant to large expense in complying
with the terms of the law or ordinance." 90 Based on this language it seems
clear that the Bottle Bill's impact on industry does not destroy its con-
stitutionality. Since the language used in Northwestern Laundry is broad
in scope, it could be argued that the language, if taken literally, would
mean that no impairment, however great, would invalidate the statute
and therefore such language should be qualified or limited to the facts in
the case. Such an argument has been encompassed, at least by implication,
in Society of Plastics Industry v. City of New York,9' wherein the
Supreme Court of New York County in New York held that a city tax,
which taxed only plastic containers in order to promote their recycling,
and to reduce the cost of waste disposal, was held to be violative of due
process since the tax destroyed an industry to the benefit of its com-
petitors without proof of any legitimate public interest being procured.
92
Because of the similarity of the statute in the Plastics Industry case
to the Bottle Bill, it could be argued that a case in point is present in
deciding the case of substantive due process. But the Plastics Industry
case can be distinguished on its facts since the court found that it cost
no more nor no less to collect plastic containers than to collect paper,
metal or glass containers.93 The court also concluded that the enforcement
of the tax would cause a substitution of paper, glass, or metal containers
for plastic ones and therefore the cost of waste disposal would increase
rather than decrease.94 These facts are clearly distinguishable from the
facts already enumerated concerning the impact and effect the Bottle Bill
has on industry and the reduction of litter and solid waste disposal.
Therefore it cannot be concluded that Plastics Industry should be
precedent for the Bottle Bill legislation, and it would be more consistent
to follow the ruling in Northwestern Laundry cited above. This is exactly
what an Oregon State Circuit Court ruled when it upheld the Oregon
Bottle Bill as not being violative of the due process clause. 5
Since the Bottle Bill has not been ruled upon by either the Supreme
Court of Oregon or the United States Supreme Court, it cannot be stated
with any degree of certainty whether or not the Bottle Bill is in violation
of the tenth amendment or the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth
amendment. However, the present case law seems to suggst that the
Bottle Bill is constitutional on both grounds.
90 Id. at 491-492.
9168 Misc.2d 366, 326 N.Y.S.2d 788 (1971).
92 Id. at 383, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 805.
93 Id. at 378, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 800.
94 Id.
95 American Can Company v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 4 E.R.C. 1584 (Ore.
Cir. Ct., 1972).
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The police power and due process analysis does not end the
constitutional dilemma facing the Bottle Bill. To be upheld as constitu-
tional, it must be shown that the Bottle Bill also does not violate equal
protection, interstate commerce, or preemption. Until that is established,
the Bottle Bill's constitutionality exists on tenuous grounds. Therefore, an
analysis of these issues is pertinent.
Briefly, there is already precedent for upholding the Bottle Bill as
constitutional under the equal protection clause since the Supreme Court
of Vermont, in Anchor Hocking Glass Corp. v. Barber,
96 ruled that a
state statute which prohibited the sale of beer and ale in non-returnable
glass containers was not a denial of equal protection. The court held that
a law is not invalid as violative of equal protection unless the inequality
produced is unreasonable and arbitrary.97 The statute's purpose was to
reduce the litter of such containers on the state's highways in order to
minimize injury to travelers and the physical danger to real and personal
property of adjacent landowners. 98 The court believed that despite other
items of litter on state highways, the legislature might have believed that
because of their number and size and the likelihood of them being thrown
away legislation should be enacted to control their use; and, therefore, the
court felt that the discrimination was not invidious." The Oregon and
Ohio bills are more encompassing than the Vermont statute and less dis-
criminatory since they include soft drink containers which are equivalent
in number and size to beer containers. 1 ° Therefore, under the language of
the Barber case there should not be a denial of equal protection.
The most important constitutional issue that challenges the constitu-
tionality of the Oregon and Ohio bills is whether or not they violate the
Commerce Clause. In Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona'0 ' the United
States Supreme Court defined the boundaries in which the states may
exercise their police power when it stated:
When the regulation of matters of local concern is local in character
and effect, and its impact on the national commerce does not
seriously interfere with its operations, and the consequent incentive
to deal with them nationally is light, such regulation has been
generally held to be within state authority.
But ... the states have not been deemed to have authority to
96 Anchor Hocking Glass Corp. v. Barber, 118 Vt. 206, 105 A.2d 271 (1954). See
also Police Department of The City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)
which stated that in equal protection cases "[t]he crucial question is whether there is
an appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by the differential treatment"
9Id. at 211, 105 A.2d at 275.
98 Id. at 213, 105 A.2d at 276.
99 Id. at 214, 105 A.2d at 277.
100 American Can Company v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 4 E.R.C. 1584 at
1592 (Ore. Cir. Ct., 1972).
101 Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1944).
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impede substantially the free flow of commerce from state to state,
or to regulate those phases of the national commerce which, because
of the need of national uniformity, demand that their regulation,
if any, be prescribed by a single authority. 0 2
The Court then went on to recognize that most cases will fall between
these two extremes, in which case, the actual effect upon interstate
commerce must be weighed against the local interests of the state. 03
This balancing process was performed by the court in Dean Milk
Co. v. City of Madison.0 4 In that case a state statute was enacted which
regulated the sale of milk by mandating that all milk be pasteurized in
bottles at a pasteurizing plant within five miles of the center of the
city. The court struck this statute down on the basis that it protected local
industry by discriminating against interstate commerce, but the Court went
on to qualify the discriminatory standards set out by stating that a
discriminatory standard could be upheld if there is no other reasonable
method of safeguarding the local interests of the state. 05 This is an impor-
tant distinction when weighing state interests against national interests
since, in effect, the state's police power is expanded to effectuate a local
interest where no other reasonable alternative is available notwithstanding
its discriminatory effect on interstate commerce. Therefore, under the
guidelines set by Southern Pacific and Dean Milk, a determination must be
made as to whether or not the Oregon and Ohio bills violate the
Commerce Clause.
An early Supreme Court case upheld a state statute that regulated
standards for certain containers in which horticulture products were
marketed. 0 18 Out-of-state manufacturers of such containers challenged the
statute stating that the statute excludes them from the in-state market
since their plants were unequipped to manufacture containers under the
standards set by the statute. 07 However, the Court ruled that the statute
did not unduly burden interstate commerce since the statute applied
uniformly to all containers regardless of their origin, and the out-of-state
manufacturers were not precluded from shipping their containers into the
state but were only restricted as to their use of their product while in
intrastate commerce. 08 The statute in the White case is similar to the
Ohio and Oregon bills in that there is uniform application among all
the affected industry whether it be interstate or intrastate as the analysis
of the two bills indicates. The White case, however, looked to whether
102 Id. at 767.
103 Id. at 768-769. See Stern, supra note 84, at 452.
104 Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
'05 Id. at 354.
106 Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935).
107 Id. at 183.
108 Id. at 184.
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or not the state statute affected interstate commerce before it crossed
state lines. Since such a test is not viable today because of the
pervasiveness given to the Commerce Clause by the Court, to uphold
the Ohio and Oregon bills merely on White would be tenuous.
A case giving more strength to the constitutionality of the Ohio and
Oregon bills under the Commerce Clause is Huron Portland Cement
Co. v. City of Detroit.09 In that case, the court upheld a state statute
which enforced a smoke ordinance on all vessels, including those in
interstate commerce, in order to abate pollution." 0 The court held that
even-handed regulations by a state are valid unless they unduly burden
interstate commerce and, consequently, determined that there was no such
burden.I Therefore, under Huron Cement a state statute does not violate
the Commerce Clause if its regulation is even-handed and not duly
burdensome on interstate commerce. As was previously shown, the Ohio
and Oregon bills are constitutionally sound in that they apply uniformly
to all industry, whether interstate or intrastate. However, what is unduly
burdensome on interstate commerce is a nebulous standard relying on the
factual situations in each case for its determination.
It must be conceded that the Ohio and Oregon bills will have an
impact on industry, especially can manufacturers, as stated above. But
recent decisions dealing with state statutes that prohibit the sale of
phosphate-based detergents within state borders have held that there is no
undue burden on interstate commerce,"12 especially when the only burden
alleged is increased cost to interstate businessmen. m The increased cost to
interstate commerce was weighed against the state's desire to preserve its
waters. For instance, recognizing the imminent problem of water pollution
and based on the conclusive facts that phosphates add tremendously to
entrophication, the court in Soap and Detergent Association v. Clark"
4
stated that the increased cost to interstate businessmen is a "normal
business response to new legislation to preserve and protect the nation's
waters." Taking this into consideration, with the growing accumulation of
solid waste" 5 and the national concern over the problem, it is logically
109 Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
110 Id. at 443-444.
lu Id. at 448.
112 See generally Soap and Detergent Assoc. v. Clark, 3 E.R.C. 1075 (S.D. Fla.
1971); North Shore Sanitary v. Pollution Control Board (Ill. App. Ct. 1972); Soap
and Detergent Assoc. v. Offutt, 3 E.R.C. 1117 (S.D. Ind. 1971); Soap and Detergent
Assoc. v. Akron, 1 ENviRON. L. RPTR. 10043 (Ohio C.P. 1972); Colgate Palmolive
Co. v. Erie County, 327 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1971).
113 Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Eng'r v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific
R.R. Co., 393 U.S. 129 (1968), noted in, Soap and Detergent Assoc. v. Clark, 3
E.1C. 1075, 1077 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
n43 E.R.C. 1075, 1078 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
11 See Note, supra note 5; see Hollister, supra note 4, at 687.
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consistent to conclude that the increased cost to interstate manufacturers
under the Ohio and Oregon bills is also merely a normal business
response to the outcries of a need for a viable control over the solid
waste and litter problems.
In all fairness it should be noted that although increased costs to
interstate commerce were equally placed on intrastate businessmen,' 6
nevertheless, interstate industry is discriminated against in that its trans-
portation costs to reship its returnable bottles will be greater than
intrastate industry, therefore placing a higher retail price on their product.
It must be remembered that the Ohio and Oregon bills will cause
non-returnables to be eliminated from the market; and, therefore, the
practical application of the statute itself causes an obvious price
discrimination against interstate industry. But notwithstanding that fact, a
state's need to control its solid waste problem far outweighs the right for
interstate industry to deal freely in interstate commerce. State interest to
control litter and solid waste by use of Bottle Bill legislation falls under
the exception stated in Dean Milk'' 7 because the only efficacious method
for controlling solid waste is to control production of those items that end
up in the solid waste mass. As previously stated, present methods of solid
waste control are below adequate standards and are incapable of handling
our present solid waste problem. And although the Ohio and Oregon bills
do not totally eliminate litter and solid waste, statistics show that such
legislation does aid substantially in the curtailment of such problems.
Therefore, industries' right to sell their products within a state without the
added burden placed upon them by a mandatory deposit system is clearly
outweighed by the need to limit litter and solid waste.
In the only court decision to date '- that has ruled on the Oregon
Bill or any other similar bill, the trial court distinguished the instrumental-
ities of interstate commerce, i.e., trucks, trains, etc., from commerce itself.
The court stated that unreasonable burdens on interstate commerce are
usually only recognized when a state attempts to regulate the very instru-
mentalities of interstate commerce or when it attempts to pass legislation
which seeks to give intrastate industry an economic advantage.M The
court concluded that neither element was present and upheld the Bill's
constitutionality. However, whether or not these distinctions will be recog-
nized by the Oregon Supreme Court cannot be determined. But despite
this fact, it does seem clear that case law is present to uphold the Oregon
Bill along with the Ohio Bill under the Commerce Clause.
Purposely, this comment has dealt with the topic of solid waste as
L6 See Soap and Detergent Assoc. v. Offutt, 3 E.R.C. 1117, 1119-20 (S.D. Ind. 1971).
L17 Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
n8 American Can Company v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 4 E.R.C. 1584 (Ore.
Cir. Ct. 1972).
119 Id. at 1591.
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being merely a state problem per se, but such is not the case. Due to its
complexity and pervasiveness throughout the country, the federal govern-
ment has enacted legislation recognizing it as a major social problem that
is national in scope. For instance, in 1965 Congress enacted the Solid
Waste Disposal Act' 2 0 for the purpose of promoting solid waste manage-
ment and resource recovery systems on the state level.' 2' Although the
Act provided for financial and technical assistance to states concerning
their solid waste problems, the Act concluded that, though national in
scope, the problems of solid waste disposal "should continue to be
primarily the function of the State ... ."122 However, in 1970 the Act was
amended by the Resource Recovery Act to further the development and
control of the solid waste problem. The question that must be answered,
and one that will challenge the constitutionality of statutes that place
mandatory deposits on beverage containers, is whether or not the 1970
Act preempts any state regulations in the area of solid waste control. 23
In determining the preemption issue, the courts first determine
whether or not the federal and state regulations conflict to such a degree
as to impair the federal regulation. 24 If no such conflict exists, the state
regulation will be upheld unless the subject matter being regulated is of
national interest and demands uniform regulation. 23 This is substantiated
by the language used by the court in Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit-'
wherein the court concluded:
In determining whether state regulation has been preempted by
federal action, "the intent to supersede the exercise by the State of
its police power as to matters not covered by the Federal legislation
is not to be inferred from the mere fact that Congress has seen fit to
circumscribe its regulations and to occupy a limited field. In other
words, such intent is not to be implied unless the Act of Congress
fairly interpreted is in actual conflict with the law of the State."'-M
To reiterate, the Resource Recovery Act of 1970 attempts to promote
solid waste management and to facilitate resource recovery systems to
control solid waste. It could be argued that the Ohio and Oregon bills
therefore conflict with the federal legislation and are thereby preempted.
But the Act defines solid waste as follows: "The term 'solid waste' means
garbage, refuse, and other discarded solid materials ... ." The words
12042 U.S.C.A. § 3251, amending 42 U.S.C.A. § 3251 (Supp. I, 1973).
121 Id. at § 3251 (b).
2 Id. at § 3251 (a) (6).
123 See Schmoyer, supra note 6, at 312.
124 See Note, Federal Preemption and State Regulation of Radioactive Air Pollution:
Who Is the Master of the Atomic Genie? 2 ENVIRON. L. REv. 399 (1971).
'25 Id.
126 Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 36 2 U.S. 440 (1960).
127 Id. at 443.
128 42 U.S.CA. § 3252(4) (1965).
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"other discarded materials" imply that the Act is limited only to products,
etc., after they have been discarded. If this is so, the Ohio and Oregon
bills could be distinguished in that they attempt only to alleviate the
increase in solid waste and do not attempt to control it directly; and, a
fortiori, the state and federal regulations do not conflict. However,
Section 205(9) (2) of the Resource Recovery Act provides:
(9) The Secretary shall carry out an investigation and study to
determine--
(2) changes in current product characteristics and the produc-
tion and packaging practices which would reduce the
amount of solid waste;
The language in that Section appears to encompass the field being
regulated by the Oregon Bill and the Ohio Bill if enacted. But it is
important to note that Section 205(9) only authorizes the Secretary to
carry out an investigation with reports of such investigation being reported
to the President.'3 ' There is no explicit language in the Act authorizing
or mandating that legislation be enacted in that area. And in Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 30 the court cautioned that:
Federal regulation of a field of commerce should not be deemed
preemptive of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive
reasons-either that the nature of the regulated subject matter
permits no other conclusion, or that Congress has unmistakenly
so ordained.m
Under the above language, it is at least plausible to conclude that the
federal legislation does not dictate that the states may not regulate in
the area of controlling production. At least until Congress decides that
it is essential that it enact specific legislation to preempt the field in this
area, it is safe to say that state legislation is valid,m since it does not
conflict with any specific federal legislation now in force. Also, such
legislation facilitates rather than burdens the solid waste problem dealt
with in the Resource Recovery Act. And although the Resource Recovery
Act defines the solid waste problem as national in scope, it nevertheless
specifically states that solid waste should be the primary responsibility of
the state, implying that the federal regulation be merely supervisory.
1 Id.
130 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
131 Id. at 142.
132 See Society of Plastics Industry, Inc. v. New York, 68 Misc.2d 366, 326 N.Y.S.2d
788 (1971).
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CONCLUSION
It should be realized that environmental problems are technologically,
economically, and constitutionally complex, with no panacea readily
available to abate them. We must cut through the rhetoric of many
industrial and environmental leaders and begin a concerted effort among
government, industry and people. This is what the House Bill 869 and
the Oregon Bottle Bill represent. This legislation combined with all the
other similarly proposed legislation is the first major effort by government
to take a hard look at the environmental problems of litter and solid
waste and to realize that what must be made is an economic sacrifice to
preserve the quality of our environment. Our gross national product
will be reduced because such legislation necessarily transforms the
non-returnable beverage container industry into a returnable one, thereby
causing a reduction in production. But as was stated, controlling litter and
solid waste before it is created seems to be the only viable solution that is
currently available to abate these problem areas. Industry will suffer; this
is an inevitable consequence, but this is the sacrifice that it must make in
order to help preserve the already dwindling quality of our environment.
Because of the substantial impact that environmental problems have on
our lifestyle, industry must begin to recognize its social responsibility
in helping preserve our environment, especially since it is a major
contributor to the problem. Industry can no longer expect society en
masse to carry its burden; it must now make a sacrifice.
Since industry owes a duty to its stockholders to maximize profits, it
must be the government who supplies the impetus needed to force
industry to respond to our ever-expanding environmental problems. This
has been cogently summarized as follows:
The overwhelming need is to arrange an overdue marriage between
economics and ecology; to bring the corporate system to realize that
the earth is not a vast storehouse of natural wealth to be drawn upon
freely for our material well-being but is also our abode, the place we
live and bring up our children and seek psychic sustenance.
33
The people will also have to make a sacrifice to enhance the quality
of our environment. At least as to the beverage container problem,
consumers must now shed their laziness if a returnable system is
implemented. A consumer conscientiousness can and will be developed,
not only as to the beverage containers and the solid waste problem, but
also to all other facets of our environment. However, this conscientious-
ness will have to be molded by government and slowly nurtured. Mass
education through advertisements is not the answer, but governmental
regulation which offers no better alternative is.
133 R. COOLEY AND G. WANDESFORDE-SMITH, Conclusions: Congress and the Environ-
ment of the Future, CONORESS AND THE ENVmONMENT, 241 (1970).
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Ohio Bill 869 is one of many steps needed to be taken in order to
keep this country beautiful. A concerted effort by government, industry,
and the people is more than just an idealistic hypothesis, it is a precept
that must be effectuated in order to preserve our environment.
GARY R. MYERS
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